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On May 1, 2003, in Kabul flanked by his obedient client, Hamid Karzai, Secretary
Rumsfeld announced to the world that the United States had moved from a period of
major combat activity to a period of stability and reconstruction in Afghanistan. The
'news' was gushingly reported by the U.S. mainstream corporate press, e.g., Matt Kelley
of the Associated Press and a favorite of the U.S. colonels at the Bagram base. 1
                                                           
1 Matt Kelley, "Rumsfeld: Combat Activity Over in Afghanistan," Associated Press (May 1, 2003)
2Fact:  between June 1, 2003 - February 1, 2004, about 1,000 Afghans died in the
continuing civil and guerrilla war and in December 2003, U.S. forces carried out
their largest deployment since December 2001 in Tora Bora.2
On July 4, 2003, Arnold Schwarzenegger, paid a lightning visit to U.S. troops at Camp
Victory off Highway Eight on the Baghdad airport road.3  While there, he announced,
"I play the Terminator, but you guys are the real terminators."4
Fact:  those 'terminated" by the 'guys' include about 4,000 civilians in Afghanistan
and another 10,000 civilians in Iraq.5
Fact:  a little-known truth about the United States'  two conflicts in Central Asia, is
that the Afghan one is more deadly and far more costly than the Iraq one.   As the
following Table 1  documents, a U.S. soldier is three times more likely to be killed in
Afghanistan than in Iraq. The comparison is not perfect insofar as U.S. troops have been
in Afghanistan since December 2001, but only since April 2003 in Iraq.  Most of the U.S.
deaths in both Afghanistan and Iraq have occurred after the quick initial military
successes.6 Whereas there are fourteen times more U.S. troops in Iraq than in
Afghanistan, the total numbers of civilians killed in Iraq are only 2.5 times greater than
those killed in Afghanistan. The monthly cost to the U.S taxpayer of supporting one U.S.
soldier for one month in Iraq is $ 33,000, whereas in Afghanistan the figure is $ 122,000.
The difference is due to the far greater number of support troops outside the actual
conflict zone in Afghanistan and that much of the fighting there has involved more
expensive air power (both bombing and airborne assaults).
                                                           
2 on December 2, 2003, U.S. forces launched their largest military operation in Afghanistan since the Tora Bora offensive in
December 2001. Named 'Operation Avalanche" it involved 4 U.S. battalions supported by helicopters and attack aircraft in the
provinces of Paktia and Paktika.
3 "Terminator Pays Lightning Independence Day Visit With US troops in Iraq," Agence France-Presse (July 4, 2003), at:
http://www.terradaily.com/2003/030704085315.q4mc55dx.html
4 Paul Carr, "Arnold Says US Troops Are 'Real Terminators'," Dawn (September 19, 2003), at:
http://www.dawn.com/2003/09/19/int16.htm
5 for details on Afghan casualties see my "A Day-to-Day Chronicle of Afghanistan's Civil and Guerrilla War, June 2003 - Present," at:
http://pubpages.unh.edu/~mwherold , and for deaths in Iraq, see  "Iraq Body Count," at: http://www.iraqbodycount.net
6 Bradley Graham, "Disparity in Iraq, Afghanistan War Costs Scrutinized," Washington Post (November 11, 2003), at:
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A23970-2003Nov10?language=printer , and ""Afghan Death Toll Reaches 100,"
Associated Press (January 13, 2004)
3Table 1.  Afghanistan and Iraq Compared, early 2004
Afghanistan Iraq
U.S. military deaths ~ 110 ~ 530
U.S. troops in theater 9,000 135,000
Ratio of deaths to
troops in theater
1.2 % 0.4 %
Cumulative civilian
deaths
~ 4,000 ~ 10,000
Monthly cost to U.S.
tax payer  of
occupation
($ 950 mn - ) $ 1 bn ($ 3.9 bn - ) $ 4.4
bn
Monthly cost to
support one soldier in
theater






Total forces involved 44,000 222,000
Monthly total cost per
soldier in area
$ 23,000 $ 20,000
The U.S. spends per month on the Afghan occupation about what the Kabul regime
receives from its Washington patron in a year. In Fall 2003, the U.S. was reportedly
spending $ 3.9 bm a month in Iraq and $ 950 mn in Afghanistan, compared to a peak
monthly outlay of $ 5.1 bn in Vietnam in inflation-adjusted dollars.7
                                                           
7 Dave Moniz, "Monthly Costs of Iraq, Afghan Wars Approach That of Vietnam," USA Today (September 7, 2003), at:
http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2003-09-07-cover-costs_x.htm
4I shall make three inter-related arguments in this three-part essay.8 First, the specter of
Vietnam is growing in Afghanistan, though with some important differences. Secondly,
since the retreat of the Taliban and their allies from Kandahar in December 2001, the
quality of everyday life has not improved for the great majority of Afghans.9 Indeed,
Afghanistan is better described as "an outright humanitarian disaster" - violence is
endemic, corruption and extortion are rampant, the countryside is balkanized into
fiefdoms, opium is the crop of choice, most Afghans (87%) still have no access to clean
water, the lot of women has barely improved, etc.. Thirdly, the twentieth century reality
of two Afghanistans - largely comprised of Kabul and 'the Rest' - persists today. But,
Kabul is an oasis and a mirage as pointed out by Thomas Eagleton, former U.S. Senator
from Missouri.10
 The United States, its proxy Karzai, and the U.S. mainstream corporate press seek to
'window-dress' the dismal reality, with for example, hollow proclamations of "remarkable
progress being made in Afghanistan"11 (@ Rumsfeld in December 2003 in Kabul), or of
the Kabul-Kandahar highway being completed (appropriately called by some
"Afghanistan's Highway to Nowhere"12), or of a new U.S. military command center
opening in Kabul (in February 2004), or a new constitution which is no more than the
Kabul City Charter (as stated in a New York Times editorial13)  or of beauty salons and
restaurants sprouting up in Kabul, etc.14
                                                           
8 the other two parts of this essay are:  Part 2. The Persisting Misery of Everyday Life, and Part 3. Mirage and Reality: Kabul and 'the
Rest'
9 see Ilene Prusher, "For Afghans, Life Gets Worse and Worse," Christian Science Monitor (December 23, 2003), at:
http://www.oneworld.net/article/view/75738/1 . See also John Pilger, "What Good Friends Left Behind," The Guardian (September
20, 2003), at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/afghanistan/story/0,1284,1044925,00.html
10 Thomas F. Eagleton, "Kabul is an Oasis - and a Mirage," Saint Louis Post (December 4, 2003)
11 "Rumsfeld: Remarkable Progress Made in Afghanistan," Voice of America (December 4, 2003). Some individual reporters working
for the mainstream U.S. corporate do a heroic effort, e.g., people like Carlotta Gall, David Rohde, Scott Baldauf , Owais Tohid, Philip
Smucker, Mike Collett-White, Barry Bearak, John Donnelly, etc.
12 Mike Whitney, "Afghanistan's Highway to Nowhere," Counterpunch (December 19, 2003), at:
http://www.counterpunch.org/whitney12192003.html
13 "High Risks in Afghanistan," New York Times (November 17, 2003), at: http://truthout.org/docs_03/111803E.shtml
14 Tom Squitieri of USA Today specifically mentions "several positive developments - including agreement on a new constitution,
completion of a vital highway link and an economic boom in Kabul..." in "Aid Workers: Afghanistan in Jeopardy," USA Today
(December 22, 2003)
5Part 1.  Afghanistan as an Epiphany of Vietnam:  the Taliban's Second
Coming15
The specter of Vietnam began taking shape in 2002 with U.S. raids upon compounds,
villages, and neighborhoods of cities.16  The forced entries, frisking and abuse of persons
(including women and children), the ransacking of homes, and the abductions merely
served to heighten Afghan animosity towards the foreign occupier. John Pilger saw
evidence of new Vietnams in: U.S. servicemen saying that once they leave their secured
base, they are in a combat zone; renewed "search and destroy" missions carried out in
villages across Afghanistan; and in the targeting of civilians (for arrest or execution).17
Daniel Bergner who accompanied a U.S. force into the countryside south of Kandahar,
reports the enemy is everywhere and nowhere,18 and Liz Sly wrote about the same thing
in eastern Afghanistan.19  Nick Meo provided a superb first-hand account of the sheer
unknown, the dangers and frustrations experienced by young American soldiers on a
nine-month tour of duty in Afghanistan.20  Others noted the resurgence of the Taliban and
its allies - Al Qaeda and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hezb-i-Islami group - by mid-2003.21
In June 2003, the Taliban publicly named a new 10-man leadership council, including
such veterans as former Defense Minister Mullah Obaidullah, Minister and commander
Jalaluddin Haqqani, and commanders Mullah Dadullah Kakar and Mullah Akhtar
Usmani.22  Mullah Usmani led Taliban forces in the south in late 2001 and was named as
                                                           
15 I've borrowed this phrase from John Wilson who used it in a different manner, arguing that Pakistan is now in allegiance with the
United States, supporting the resurrection of a defanged Taliban. See his ""Taliban: The Second Coming," Politics Agora (November
2003), at: http://www.politics-agora.com/thread5561-1
16 for details see my data base at http://pubpages.unh.edu/~mwherold, and especially  my "U.S. Special Forces in Afghanistan:
Vietnam Redux" Cursor.org (October 31, 2002), at: http://www.cursor.org/stories/vietnam_redux.htm . Scott Peterson makes
interesting parallels between the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the U.S. invasion of Iraq, in his "Afghanistan's Lessons for
Iraq," Christian Science Monitor (November 20, 2003), at:  http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/1120/p06s01-woiq.htm   
17 John Pilger, "Bush's Vietnam," New Statesman (June 22, 2003), at:
http://www.zmag.org/content/print_article.cfm?itemID=3812&sectionID=49 .
18 Daniel Bergner, "Where the Enemy is Everywhere and Nowhere," New York Times (July 20, 2003), at:
http://www.commondreams.org/headlines03/0720-07.htm
19 Liz Sly, "In Afghanistan, Progress Mixes With New Concern," Chicago Tribune (September 15, 2003)
20 Nick Meo, "The War That Just Won't End: the Hunt Goes on in Afghanistan," The Sunday Herald (July 13, 2003), at:
http://www.sundayherald.com/35223
21 see amongst many others, Victoria Burnett, "Afghan Officials See Taliban Resurgence," Boston Globe (September 25, 2003),
"Taliban Resurgence Worries US," Al Jazeera.net (October 17, 2003 at 13:01 Makka Time), and Jason Burke, "Stronger and More
Deadly, the Terror of the Taliban is Back," The Observer (November 16, 2003), at:
http://observer.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0,6903,1086197,00.html . For a more recent statement, see Jim Lobe, "Concern
Grows Over Taliban Resurgence, Opium," Antiwar.com (January 24, 2004), at: http://www.antiwar.com/lobe/?articleid=1802
22 "Taliban Names Anti-US Leadership Council," Reuters (June 24, 2003) and James Bone and Zahid Hussein, "Taleban Fighters
Regroup and Attack Coalition," The Times (June 25, 2003)
6successor to Mullah Omar should he perish. Dadullah harks from Uruzgan and Usmani
from Helmand.
By later 2002, U.S. political and military elites realized that the use of surrogates was
needed. U.S. policy pursued two avenues: the funding and training of a national police
force and an Afghan Army - akin to the policy of Vietnamization - and the search for
allies willing to contribute troops and material. A primary impetus underlying U.S.
thinking has been the perceived need to avoid U.S. casualties - body bags returning to the
home shores. But, neither of these avenues has fared well. The dropout and desertion
rates amongst the new Afghan Army is enormous and the reliability of its soldiers is very
questionable.23  The dropout rate at the large Pul-i-Charki training center - operated by
U.S. and French troops - outside Kabul is over 30% - 2,000 recruits out of 6,000 simply
vanished. Afghan militia forces working with U.S. troops are known to engage in
beatings, torture, and pillage.24  Few allies have been willing to donate significant
numbers of troops and a desperate U.S. has found itself needing to cultivate the likes of
Romanians, Croatians, and even Serbs (who fought against Muslims!).25 Some nations
like Canada have even decided to reduce commitments.
By later 2002, another Vietnam-era tactic was introduced. In Vietnam, the United States
established the infamous  U.S.A.I.D. Civic Action Teams, units of ~100 soldiers
combining military and civilian officers. In Afghanistan, these have been resurrected
though renamed as Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), formed and slowly
introduced in various cities, combining intelligence gathering, military operations and
civilian reconstruction projects. To date, eight such teams have been formed. The tactic
of militarizing humanitarian assistance has been roundly criticized by most in the non-
governmental organizations as it blurs the distinction between military action and
reconstruction.26  Moreover, the PRT operations are excessively costly and inefficient.27
                                                           
23 Rupert Cornwell, "Vietnam's Ghosts Haunt the War in Afghanistan," The Independent (March 5, 2002) and Paul Watson, "New
Afghan Army Plagued by Gripes, Many Dropouts," Los Angeles Times (December 4, 2003)
24 Paul Watson, "Afghans Tell of Torture During Security Sweep. Villagers Say a Militia Working for the U.S. Went on a Rampage
While Hunting the Taliban," Los Angeles Times (October 30, 2003), at: http://www.agonist.org/archives/010410.html
25 David Rennie, "Serbs to Fight Beside US Troops in Afghanistan," Telegraph (June 10, 2003)
26 for an outstanding analysis, see Peace Operations Working Group of the Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee,
NGO/Government Dialogue on Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan and the Militarization of Humanitarian
Assistance: Final Report" dated December 4, 2003, at: http://www.peacebuild.ca/whatsnew/PRT-Dialogue-FinalReport.doc
7The Vietnam-era practice of forcefully creating strategic hamlets has not been pursued
for two obvious reasons. The fierce independence of Afghans would be severely crossed
resulting in snowballing resistance. Secondly, U.S. forces are simply not large enough to
pursue such a tactic.  Instead, the U.S has relied upon air power and rapid deployment
ground forces (often heli-born) from its three major bases - Bagram, Kandahar and Khost
- with a sprinkling of smaller usually Special Forces fire bases scattered across the east
and south of the country.
 In effect, the U.S. has been caught between practicing either Occupation Heavy or
Occupation Lite.  The former was eschewed for fear of repeating the Soviet experience of
the 80s in Afghanistan. The latter was adopted though with minimal results.28 The
effectiveness of central Afghan Army proxy fighting forces has been poor and the
allegiance of warlord armies sporadic at best (e.g., best known case is that of one-time
U.S. warlord Padshah Khan Zadran of Paktia, but also the powerful Ismail Khan in
Herat).
Differences exist between the U.S. campaigns in Vietnam and Afghanistan. Most
importantly, the terrain of Afghanistan combined with the extraordinary development of
U.S. 'eyes in the skies' simply does not permit large concentrations of Taliban forces. The
Taliban and allies must limit attacks to stealth forays by small units. Secondly, some like
to point out that the Taliban and allies do not have a secure, friendly neighbor able to
provide arms, sanctuary, etc.. But the strong tribal support for the Taliban in Pakistan's
rugged western provinces de facto serves these functions, a reality strengthened in
October 2002  with the election of  a radical Islamic coalition to the state governments of
the NWFP and Balochistan. The province of Balochistan which accounts for 43 percent
of Pakistan's territory is particularly sympathetic to the Taliban as reported by Scott
Baldauf and Owais Tohid of the Christian Science Monitor.29  The Afghan-Pakistan
border is virtually un-policeable and porous and the Pakistani side has become a safe
                                                                                                                                                                               
27 see James Ingalls, "Buying Hearts & Minds in Afghanistan," Z Magazine 16,2 (December 2003), p. 31.
28 David Rohde, "Different Wars, Different Postwars," New York Times (July 13, 2003), at: http://e-
ariana.com/ariana/eariana.nsf/0/D833A89C197171E087256D63000E6C2C?OpenDocument
29 Scott Baldauf and Owais Tohid, "Where the Taliban Go To Find Warm Beds and Recruits," Christian Science Monitor (December
10, 2003), at: http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-022202hunt,1,806160.story
8haven for the hunted Taliban and Al Qaeda.30 Moreover, Mullah Omar remains firmly in
control of Taliban operations, directing such through a 10-man leadership council that
was formed in June 2003.31  The reorganized rebels appeared well-funded and highly
motivated.32  The ample cash served to acquire sophisticated equipment including sat
phones and night-vision goggles.33  By mid-2003, the Taliban resistance was making use
of remote-controlled devices which increase the effectiveness of the guerrillas.34  They
had set up mobile training camps in the border regions.35 In later 2003, the Taliban
formed four committees - on political, military, cultural and economic affairs - to make
their resistance against coalition forces more effective.36 By August 2003, the
reorganized Taliban appointed a military commander for the northern region, (including
Faryab), Mullah Mohammad Asim Muttaqi.37 A couple days later, a convoy of vehicles
traveling on a road between Maimana and Almar in Faryab was attacked at night, killing
11 persons.38
Taliban spokespersons have publicly elaborated upon their politico-military strategy. The
group's goal is to tie down the U.S. (and NATO) in Afghanistan and force it to spend
huge sums on the occupation, responding to limited though geographically dispersed hit-
and-run attacks, e.g. ambushes and rocket attacks. The mujahideen employ the classic
pattern of insurgent warfare:  the enemy attacks, we retreat; the enemy camps, we raid;
the enemy tires, we attack.39 The U.S. would gradually be sapped by such a slow, costly
and grinding conflict and would abandon Afghanistan after 2-3 years.40 The Taliban have
increasingly directed their attacks precisely at the 'softer' proxy forces, killing 400-500
                                                           
30 see the description amongst many others by Jason Burke, "In the Lair of the Hunted Taliban," The Observer (November 10, 2003),
and Juliette Terzieff, "Pakistani Tribesmen Stay Fundamentally Faithful to the Taliban. Farmers Put Down Polows to Take Up Arms
Against US " San Francisco Chronicle (November 11, 2003), at: http://www.commondreams.org/headlines03/1111-09.htm , and
Massoud Ansari, "On the Job With a Taliban Recruiter," Asia Times Online (November 26, 20030 at:
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/EK26Df03.html
31 "Fugitive Taliban Leader 'Still in Control'," The Guardian (November 14, 2003), citing Reuters, at:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/afghanistan/story/0,1284,1084682,00.html .
32 Scott Baldauf and Owais Tohid, "Taliban Appears To Be Re-grouped and Well-Funded," Christian Science Monitor (May 8, 2003),
at:  http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/0508/p01s02-wosc.html
33 "Cashed-Up Taliban Get Satphones," The Australian (September 23, 2003), citing Agence France-Presse
34 Syed Saleem Shahzad, "Afghan Resistance Takes Shape," Asia Times (August 16, 2003)
35 Owais Tohid, "Taliban Regroups - On the Road," Christian Science Monitor (June 27, 2003), at:
http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/0627/p06s01-wosc.html?related
36 "Taliban Form 4 Bodies," Daily Times (November 13, 2003), which gives the names of leading committee members.
37 "Taliban to Extend Attacks to Afghan North - Report," Reuters (August 10, 2003) at 4:07 AM ET
38 "50 Taliban Killed in Afghanistan," The News (August 26, 2003)
39 Jeff Elkins, "An Elusive Victory in Afghanistan," LewRockwell.com (December 31, 2002), at:
http://www.lewrockwell.com/elkins/elkins75.html
9Afghan troops between June 1, 2003 and January 1, 2004, while only killing less than ten
American soldiers. For example, such sporadic, small unit attacks killed nine U.S.
soldiers in the Shkin area of Paktika alone in 2003.41
The heavy-handed U.S. search-and-destroy forays over time swell the ranks of
supporters, as the battle for Afghan hearts and minds tipped in favor of the Taliban.42
U.S. aerial 'decapitation raids' frequently devastate small villages and families. In January
2004, two U.S. raids killed 15 children and not a single Taliban was either captured or
killed.  The reality of living daily in fear is captured in the words of a young girl in Loi
Karez, Zabul:
"Whenever these tall people with blue eyes come to our village, we
become very scared," said eight-year-old Saira Bibi as she fetched water
from a well in Loi Karez. "They take away people and ask us about the
Taliban. I haven't seen the Taliban. I don't know who these Taliban are."43
A similar perspective is offered in Qalat, Zabul province, in January 2004:
" .... for many people a much more visible aspect of American intervention
is the steady stream of civilian casualties. And in Qalat, there is hostility to
patrols by American special forces. From a Humvee a man gets out
wearing a stetson and sheriff’s badge, and proceeds to have a loud
argument with a colleague carrying a sawn-off shotgun. As they move
away, the locals stare after them. "We are so unhappy when we see them,"
says Rahmatullah, a bearded 29-year-old shopkeeper watching from
across the road. "When the Russians came here we fought to save our
liberty and independence. So also Americans came... and so we will be
                                                                                                                                                                               
40 David Rohde, "Taliban Officials Outline Plan to Defeat U.S. in Afghanistan," New York Times (September 12, 2003), at:
http://www-tech.mit.edu/V123/N39/long_2_39.39w.html
41 see David Rohde, "The Other Conflict Continues to Take a G.I. Toll," New York Times (November 24, 2003), at:
http://www.truthout.org/docs_03/112503F.shtml
42 "US Losing Battle for Afghan Hearts and Minds," AlJazeera.net (August 15, 2003) at 2:50 AM GMT citing a Reuters report . See
also Luke Harding, "Heavy Hand of America Fans the Taliban Embers Into Life," The Guardian (June 18, 2003), at:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/afghanistan/story/0,1284,979617,00.html
43 "U.S. Troops Provoke Afghan Anger," Reuters (August 17, 2003), at: http://www.marchforjustice.com/8.15.03.afghananger.php
10
fighting them."44
During a search of the village of Atel Mohammed in Kandahar by U.S. Special Forces
(and their allies of the Afghan Militia Forces) in the summer of 2003,
"scared Afghans in the southern province of Kandahar hid holy Quran and
other religious items before United States troops searched their village,
afraid the Americans would kill them for being Muslims."45
By December 2003, even The Economist was fretting over "the high price of hunting the
Taliban."46 In addition, many Afghans believe that a weary U.S will soon exit
Afghanistan leaving the terrain to the Taliban and Al Qaeda.  For villagers, survival when
that happens means keeping mouths shut now.47 In the border regions, deeply
conservative Pashtun tribesmen take cash from Al Qaeda and Taliban supporters for food
and other supplies  and count 'blessings' from Al Qaeda.48
The other element of the strategy is to render much of the countryside inaccessible to aid-
reconstruction effort, by carrying out strikes upon aid workers, selected high-visibility
assassinations and kidnappings, destroying their facilities and equipment, and burning
down schools. By mid-2003, even the U.S. mainstream corporate press has begun
reporting upon a countryside inaccessible to agencies.49  In December 2003, the Chicago
Tribune's Liz Sly reported on the wholesale retreat of international aid agencies
operations across the south and east of Afghanistan.50  For example, the staff of
International Committee of the Red Cross in Kandahar province dropped to two by
August from ten in March before the execution-murder of a Red Cross worker in March
                                                           
44 "Nation Torn Between Taliban and Uncle Sam," The Scotsman (January 18, 2004), at:
http://news.scotsman.com/international.cfm?id=63492004
45 "Afghans Hide Quran From US Troops," Dawn (July 26, 2003), at: http://www.dawn.com/2003/07/26/int6.htm
46 "Making Enemies," The Economist (December 11, 2003)
47 Bergner, op. cit.
48 Owais Tohid, "Tribesmen Take Cash, Count 'Blessings' From Al Qaeda," Christian Science Monitor (October 29, 2003), at:
http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/1029/p01s03-wosc.html
49 Robyn Dixon, "Afghanistan Slipping Into Chaos, Warn Aid Agencies," Los Angeles Times (August 14, 2003), at:
http://www.miami.com/mld/miamiherald/news/world/6527601.htm
50 Liz Sly, "Afghan Violence Cripples Aid Effort," Chicago Tribune (December 21, 2003), at:
http://www.agonist.org/archives/012144.html .
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2003.51  The right-hand man of former Taliban Interior Minister Abdul Razzak himself,
now military commander for the Taliban in the south and southeast, the notorious Mullah
Dadullah, native of Uruzgan and one-time senior Taliban commander in the Kunduz
region, ordered the killing of the 39-year-old Red Cross worker.52 Taliban attacks were
effectively  undermining relief work by the United Nations.53 A drop in aid workers and
projects, fuels the impression that the West is pulling out.
A new component which contributes to the generalized insecurity has been added in
2003: suicide bombings in major urban centers, a tactic imported from the Palestine
theater.54  The first such attack took place in the heart of Kabul on June 7, 2003, when a
car bomber drove his vehicle into a bus full of German ISAF troops, killing at least
four.55
In a widely reported statement made on February 9, 2004, at the U.S. base at Bagram,
U.S. Marine General James L. Jones, NATO's supreme commander in Europe,
announced that “the (Afghan) opposition is running out of steam.”  Facts on the ground
show otherwise. The Taliban military strategy of launching small attacks upon U.S. and
Afghan facilities, killing personnel with suicide attacks, employing mines and improvised
explosive devices to destroy convoy operations, and selectively murdering staff engaged
in “reconstruction” was evident over just three days in Afghanistan in an area covering he
west, the east and the central south :
                                                           
51 Mike Collett-White, "Taliban Giving Tough Time to US, Afghan Government," Dawn (August 27, 2003), at:
http://www.dawn.com/2003/08/27/int13.htm
52 Todd Pitman and Kathy Gannon, "No Peace in Afghanistan," Associated Press (May 1, 2003).  Dadullah's history is explored in J.
Gettleman, "US Aids Hunt for Notorious Mullah," Los Angeles Times (February 22, 2002), at:
http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-022202hunt,1,806160.story
53 see "Taliban Resurgence Undermining UN Afghan Aid Work," China Daily (October 25, 2003 at 15:07), at:
http://www1.chinadaily.com.cn/en/doc/2003-10/25/content_275546.htm
54 Liz Sly, "Blasts Shatter Kabul Calm," Chicago Tribune (February 1, 2004), at:
http://www.sanluisobispo.com/mld/sanluisobispo/news/world/7844904.htm
55 Luke Harding, "Taliban Are Back - And With a Murderous Vengeance," The Guardian (June 8, 2003), at:
http://observer.guardian.co.uk/afghanistan/story/0,1501,973075,00.html
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Table  2.  The Taliban Military Strategy in Practice, February 2004 : 9 More Deaths










Feb. 13, 2004 Khost
Remote-controlled mine exploded
outside police station, kills 1
policeman and a shopkeeper
Suicide attacks upon
personnel
Feb. 11, 2004 Khost
Taliban attacker kills Khost deputy
intelligence chief than blows himself




Feb. 13, 2004 Ghazni
An IED - antitank mine - explodes
under Humvee of a US patrol, killing 1
and injuring 9 US troops
Attack foreign aid
operations
Feb. 14, 2004 Faryab
Taliban attacked convoy of the NGO,
OMAR, killing 4 Afghan deminers
As of late 2002, Afghanistan was becoming a classic (Vietnam) quagmire.56  The
prospect is of war without end, elusive guerrilla fighters, persisting violence, use of
ineffective local proxies, corruption and impoverishment.  The non-stop mantra in the
mainstream corporate media about "remnants" of the Taliban being at the source of this
conflict, misrepresents the depth and organization of resistance to the U.S. occupation
and is part of the U.S. propaganda war. About all the U.S. occupation force could report
on optimistically was its new 20-house military headquarters opened on February 3, 2004
in the posh Wazir Akbar Khan area of Kabul. That evening, two rockets slammed into
Kabul.
A French journalist visiting Kandahar in December 2003, wrote :
                                                           
56 Jim Lobe, "Afghanistan Quagmire," Foreign Policy in Focus (September 6, 2002), at:
http://www.fpif.org/commentary/2002/0209afquag_body.html
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"One quiet afternoon in Kandahar, a convoy of U.S. military vehicles
passed by. In the pharmacy where I was making a purchase, men who had
been chatting animatedly stopped and watched the personnel carriers drive
slowly by carrying young American soldiers chewing gum and pointing
their rifles defensively at the locals. After the last armored vehicle passed,
one of the Afghans spat in their tire tracks, and mumbled, "Inshallah, they
will leave soon."57
Maybe the Taliban's most powerful weapon against the Americans is time.
                                                           
57 Anne Nivat, "A War Eye on the Yanks and the Taliban," International Herald Tribune (December 18, 20030, at:
http://www.iht.com/articles/121870.html
